Why hedonism is bad

Those that appeal to claims about the nature of pleasure are canvassed in Section 2. Further arguments against ethical hedonism could be constructed that broadly parallel the unification, motivation, scientific naturalist, doxastic, phenomenal, explanatory, causal and epistemic arguments for ethical hedonism presented and examined in Section 2.

That task is not pursued in this entry. The following sub-sections instead review other objections to ethical hedonism. At its simplest, ethical hedonism is the thesis that all and only pleasure is good non-instrumentally, and all and only pain or displeasure is bad non-instrumentally. The non-necessity objection to this rejects its claim that only pleasure is good, or its claim that only displeasure is bad, or both of these claims.

Its thesis is that pleasure is not necessary for positive importance, or that displeasure is not necessary for negative importance, or both. Any cases that are hedonic equals but value unequals would deliver what the non-necessity objector seeks. Why would anyone think, even for a minute, that hedonism is a plausible theory of value?

Even if we focus very narrowly, just on those mental states of ours that arguably are instances of pleasure or have pleasure as a higher-order property — contentment, delight, ecstasy, elation, enjoyment, euphoria, exhilaration, exultation, gladness, gratification, gratitude, joy, liking, love, relief, satisfaction, Schadenfreude, tranquility, and so on — each of these mental states or events or properties also has one or more non-hedonic properties that contribute to its importance.

Beyond pleasure, our mental lives are full of significant and diverse thoughts, perceptions, emotions, imaginings, wishes, and so on. These engage with massively plural and diverse items in ourselves, in others, in myriad aspects of the non-human world, and in the infinities of contingent future possibility. This is true also of our relationships with ourselves and with others, and with multiple aspects of the wider world.

It is true also of our agency — our deliberations, choices, plans, intentions, and so forth. In the light of such reflections, an incredulous stare might be thought an apt response to a profession of belief in ethical hedonism. This incredulous stare argument is far from decisive, but perhaps it should disrupt any complacent presumption in favour of hedonism.

Many well-known criticisms of hedonism can reasonably be interpreted as non-necessity objections. A short survey of some of the more significant of these follows.

Plato pointed out that if your life is just one of pleasure then it would not even include any recollection of pleasure; nor any distinct thought that you were pleased, even when you were pleased.

Similarly, on J. Mill's account of him at least Mill: ch. Nozick and Nagel present schematic descriptions of lives that have all the appearance but none of the reality of self-understanding, achievement, loving relationships, self-directedness, and so on, alongside lives that have these appearances and also the corresponding realities.

On the face of it, hedonism is committed to the hedonic equality and thus the equal value of these lives. Consider further the idea that actually having certain relationships with oneself e. Ross considered two worlds that are equals both hedonically and in character terms.

In one world, the virtuous have the pleasure and the vicious have the pain, while in the other the vicious have the pleasure and the virtuous have the pain. Pleasure is equal across these two worlds, but Ross argues that the well-matched world is better than the mis-matched world.

The objectors' claim is that there is something that is sufficient for value and that is missing from the life of perfect pleasure.

If the objection stands then pleasure is not necessary for value. There is a range of possible hedonist responses to non-necessity objections.

One reply is that the allegedly non-hedonic item on which the objector focuses just is an instance of pleasure, so its being valuable is just what a hedonist would expect.

A related reply is that the item to which the objector points is sufficient for value only insofar as it is an instance of pleasure, so the thesis that pleasure is necessary for value again remains unscathed.

Responses of these sorts are relatively easy for hedonists to make; but it is less easy to show anyone who is not already a hedonist that these replies provide grounds for taking the hedonist side of the arguments. A third reply hedonists might make to non-necessity objections is to allow that the item in question is or includes non-pleasure that has value, but then to argue that this is merely instrumental value.

A fourth and more concessive reply is that the item in question might be a non-pleasure and might be sufficient for non-instrumental value of some sort e. For example, it might be claimed that self-sacrifice that protects the non-sentient environment has non-hedonic moral value but lacks prudential value for the agent. An option that is yet more concessive is for hedonists is to agree that pleasure is not necessary for value or that displeasure is not necessary for disvalue or both of these things, but to continue to insist that pleasure is sufficient for value or that displeasure is sufficient for disvalue or both of these things.

As noted above, the simplest form of ethical hedonism is the claim that all and only pleasure is good non-instrumentally and all and only pain or displeasure is bad non-instrumentally. The insufficiency objection rejects the ethical hedonist claim that all pleasure is good, or that all displeasure is bad, or both claims.

Any pair of cases that are value equals but hedonic unequals would deliver what the insufficiency objector seeks. Various insufficiency objections are outlined below. Each aims to show that some pleasure is worthless or worse and is thus insufficient for good or value. Some focus on the bad as cause of pleasure, others on the bad as object of pleasure. A third possible focus is on pleasure understood as a property of something bad such as a sadistic thought or act, rather than as an effect of something bad.

Aristotle Book x, ch. Moore sec. Self-destructive or masochistic pleasure, pleasure with a non-existent or false object, and contra-deserved pleasure are some other targets of insufficiency objections to hedonism about value. One sort of hedonist response to an insufficiency objection is to accept that the objector's case is an instance of pleasure, but then to claim that it is sufficient for value.

This response is underpinned by insistence on the wider thought that any pleasure is sufficient for value. Consistent with this, but rather concessively, it could also be claimed that pleasure is sufficient for only very little value, and that substantial or major value is present only if further conditions are met.

Feldman has formulated and sympathetically examined several views that have this sort of structure, including Altitude-Adjusted, Truth-Adjusted, and Desert-Adjusted forms of Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism. A second hedonist response is to accept that the insufficiency objector has indeed found a case that is insufficient for value, but then to claim that it is not an instance of pleasure.

This sort of response is underpinned by the hedonist's insistence on the wider thought that anything insufficient for value is not pleasure. A third hedonist response is somewhat concessive. It distinguishes at least two basic kinds of value, and continues to insist that pleasure is sufficient for one of these, while also accepting the objector's thesis that there is at least one other sort of value for which pleasure is not sufficient. One instance of this response is the claim that sadistic pleasure adds prudential value for the sadist but also lacks moral value and indeed has moral disvalue.

But such a move is more awkward in other cases, including those of pleasure that is self-destructive or masochistic.

A fourth hedonist response is concessive. It abandons altogether the thesis that pleasure is sufficient for value, while also continuing to insist that pleasure is necessary for value. Consistent with this response, one could claim that pleasure is conditionally valuable; that is, sufficient for value when and only when certain further conditions are met.

These conditions could be specified either negatively e. The critical discussion of Section 2 above has supplemented the Section 1 consideration of psychological hedonism, by examining arguments both for and against ethical hedonism. This entry has not attempted any such systematic comparative examination of psychological hedonism or ethical hedonism against its main rivals.

Both psychological hedonism and ethical hedonism remain worthy of serious philosophical attention. Each also has broader philosophical significance, especially but not only in utilitarian and egoist traditions of ethical thought, and in empiricist and scientific naturalist philosophical traditions.

Moore stonebow. Psychological Hedonism 1. Ethical Hedonism 2. Psychological Hedonism Bentham's claim that pain and pleasure determine what we do makes him a psychological hedonist, and more specifically a hedonist about the determination of action. Ethical Hedonism At its simplest, ethical hedonism is the claim that all and only pleasure has positive importance and all and only pain or displeasure has negative importance.

Hedonists can respond in various ways to insufficiency objections. These are canvassed below. Concluding Remarks The critical discussion of Section 2 above has supplemented the Section 1 consideration of psychological hedonism, by examining arguments both for and against ethical hedonism.

Bibliography Alston, W. Edwards ed. The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy , London: Macmillan. Anscombe, E. Butler ed. Aristotle 4th Cent.

BCE , Nicomachean Ethics. Gregory Crane. Bentham, J. Payne and Son. Bradley, B. Brandt, R. Brentano, F. English language edition, L. McAlister ed. English language edition, R. Chisholm ed. Broad, C. Butler, J. Carroll, L. Chisholm, R. Crane, T. Crisp, R. Dennett, D. Marcel and E. Bisiach eds. Feldman, F. Becker and C. Becker eds. Flanagan, O. Forster, E. Glover, J. Griffin, J.

Heathwood, C. Hooker, B. I will now defend the other key premise of my proposed version of the paradox of hedonism objection: Rational Desire, the claim that it is irrational to intrinsically desire what we believe is not intrinsically desirable. I will start by laying out six reasons for accepting Rational Desire; then I will defend this claim against some important objections. The first reason to accept Rational Desire is simply that it has considerable intuitive plausibility.

It is plausible that if I recognize that something is not in any way desirable again, even if it is not positively un desirable , but I still want it nevertheless, then my desire-forming mechanisms are not functioning properly. The second reason to accept Rational Desire is that this claim can be supported by parallels with at least some other attitudes.

The third reason is that it seems that we can and do exploit the connection described by Rational Desire for therapeutic purposes. That is, if we find ourselves with some particular desire that we would like to get rid of, one way to do that is to try to convince ourselves that there is nothing desirable about the relevant object.

And it is plausible that this would be a rational response, not merely a weird quirk of human psychology. For example, suppose that I no longer have time to go bird-watching, but still find myself feeling the itch, which I find distracting and frustrating. A reasonable solution, it seems, would be to try to convince myself that bird-watching is pointless anyway.

Similarly, the Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics explicitly used philosophical arguments about what objects are truly desirable as a means to help us overcome unhealthy desires and emotions. The last three reasons for accepting Rational Desire come from considering specific examples where we desire something that we believe is not desirable. First, there are cases of disillusionment. In particular, many of us, I think, have had the experience of coming to see something that we had been invested in, as pointless or worthless, and of losing interest in this thing as a result.

Winning would be a meaningless achievement, in no way worth desiring. In this case, it is plausible that you would be displaying irrationality if your passion for winning the game persisted unchanged. Second, there are cases where someone believes that something is uniquely desirable in some way directly parallel to the cases which we are interested in, where someone believes that pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically desirable.

In these cases, it is plausibly irrational for a person to desire the alternatives that she considers not to be desirable. For example, suppose that you know a medical student who claims that the only desirable specialty is surgery.

It would be surprising, and confusing, if you found out that she had her heart set on dermatology. My life came to a standstill. I could breathe, eat, drink and sleep, and I could not help breathing, eating, drinking and sleeping; but there was no life in me because I had no desires whose gratification I would have deemed reasonable to fulfil.

According to Nagel, when we suspect that nothing objectively matters, we do not lose our ordinary concerns, but we do start to regard them as absurd. Next, note that Rational Desire is not quite as strong as some more familiar views about the relation between our desires and our normative beliefs. These views, we might think, are implausibly strong.

After all, it seems obvious that creatures such as cats or babies desire things, but it might seem doubtful that these creatures have normative concepts. It might also seem plausible that, like these other creatures, more sophisticated human beings also naturally come to desire things without forming beliefs about their goodness or desirability. And moreover, it might not seem that there is anything wrong with these desires.

Luckily, these worries do not apply to Rational Desire. Rational Desire does not claim that in order to desire something, or in order to desire something rationally, we must believe that it is desirable. The view only claims that, once we come to believe that something is not desirable, then we cannot rationally continue to desire it. I have argued that we have a number of reasons to accept the claim that it is irrational to intrinsically desire something that you believe is not intrinsically desirable.

However, against this claim, it might be objected that there are surely certain things, such as which ice cream flavors we like and dislike, which are simply a matter of taste.

In these cases, it seems, it is not irrational to intrinsically desire the relevant objects, even while believing that they are not intrinsically desirable. For example, it is plausible that most of us would deny that there is anything intrinsically desirable about the experience of tasting chocolate ice cream. Rather, most of us would acknowledge that this is just something that some people happen to like. Suppose that we are both willing to grant that the tastes of both chocolate and strawberry ice cream are intrinsically desirable.

And suppose that we even believe that both tastes are desirable in virtue of the intrinsic features of the experience, and so that either experience would be desirable for either of us to have. In that case, does Rational Desire imply that I am being irrational for failing to intrinsically desire to taste strawberry ice cream, and that you are being irrational for failing to intrinsically desire to taste chocolate ice cream?

Again, Rational Desire does not claim that a rational agent has to desire whatever she believes is desirable. It claims only that a rational agent will not desire things that she believes are not desirable. I have now laid out my version of the paradox of hedonism objection, and have made the case in defense of two of its key premises.

I have also argued that the paradox of hedonism not only presents a challenge to hedonism about well-being, but that it indicates a deeper problem, the paradox of desire satisfaction, which presents a challenge to all desire-based theories of well-being. In this section, however, I will offer a solution to this challenge: what we can call the backgrounding move.

This move has previously been discussed in the literature on desire satisfactionism, largely in response to independent concerns.

Hybrid theory : What is intrinsically good for someone is to obtain [knowledge, achievement, love, etc. As we have seen, if welfarism is correct, then these theories imply the axiological theories that pleasure, desire satisfaction, and the complex state of desiring an objective good are what are intrinsically desirable.

But if Rational Desire is correct, then rational agents who believed in these axiological theories would end up desiring nothing other than pleasure, desire satisfaction, and the relevant complex states, and thus find themselves experiencing the paradox of desire satisfaction. We can avoid this problem, I suggest, by revising how we formulate these theories. Again, the model for how to do this has been provided in the literature on desire satisfactionism. Desire satisfactionism object formulation : X is intrinsically good for S just when and because S desires X.

The object formulation departs from the satisfaction formulation in its enumerative claim : its claim about which natural state intrinsically contributes to well-being. But the object formulation is still recognizably a version of desire satisfactionism.

But this fact does not itself contribute to my well-being; rather, it operates in the background, explaining why the object of my desire makes me better off. We can now see how agents who accept the object formulation of desire satisfactionism will be able to avoid the paradox of desire satisfaction. Again, if I desire to go hiking, then the object formulation implies that hiking is intrinsically good for me.

This means that I will rationally be able to desire to go hiking for its own sake. And since hiking does not essentially involve desire satisfaction, I will not be caught in a vicious circle; I can simply go hiking, and my desire will be satisfied. Now, the satisfaction formulation and the object formulation each have their proponents, and other arguments have been offered in favor of the satisfaction formulation. Enumerative claim : A certain natural state is what intrinsically has a certain normative property.

Hedonism, desire satisfactionism, and the hybrid theory make the explanatory claim that a state of affairs has the normative property of being good for someone because of its relations to pleasure, desire satisfaction, or a certain complex state.

And our original formulations of these theories make the enumerative claim that pleasure, desire satisfaction, or the relevant complex state are what intrinsically contribute to well-being. To make the backgrounding move, then, is to claim that the natural state which explains the normative property need not do this by itself possessing the normative property. Instead, the natural state operates in the background, explaining why other natural states possess the normative property.

Again, on the object formulation, desire satisfactionists claim that desire satisfaction need not itself be intrinsically good for us, but rather that it explains why other natural states are intrinsically good for us. But hedonists and hybrid theorists, I suggest, could make the same move: they could deny that pleasure or the relevant hybrid state are intrinsically good for us, but rather claim that these states make other natural states intrinsically good for us.

Hedonism object formulation : X is intrinsically good for S just when and because S takes pleasure in X. Hybrid theory object formulation : X is intrinsically good for S just when and because X is a state of [knowledge, achievement, love, etc. As with desire satisfactionism, this move would allow hedonists and hybrid theorists to escape the paradox of desire satisfaction. If I take pleasure in hiking, then hedonists can claim that hiking is intrinsically good for me, so believing that hedonism will be rationally compatible with intrinsically desiring hiking.

Similarly, if hiking is an instance of some objective good such as achievement, then believing the hybrid theory will also be rationally compatible with intrinsically desiring hiking. So on either view, I will be able to intrinsically desire objects that do not essentially involve desire satisfaction itself.

Would there be anything distinctive about the psychology of a rational agent who accepted one of these theories? In particular, a desire satisfactionist would no longer intrinsically desire, say, hiking, if she came to believe that it was not the object of the right sort of intrinsic desire; a hedonist would no longer intrinsically desire hiking if she came to believe that it was not an object of pleasure; and a hybrid theorist would no longer intrinsically desire hiking if she came to believe that it was not part of the right sort of complex state.

Why would our agents have this sort of psychology? Because these agents would believe that these objects would not be intrinsically desirable if they were not related to these states, and so Rational Desire would prevent the agent from desiring these objects.

The distinction between the satisfaction and object interpretations of desire satisfactionism grew out of a distinction made in desire-based theories of motivation; a similar distinction has also been made with regard to desire-based theories of normative reasons.

The natural state that operates in the background need not be desire: it could be pleasure or a hybrid state. But for our purposes, the important point is that desire-based theories of welfare can make use of the backgrounding move to avoid the paradox of desire satisfaction.

In this paper, I have argued that we can use the paradox of hedonism to create a challenge for hedonistic theories of well-being. We cannot merely dismiss the paradox of hedonism as an empirical inconvenience, or as a problem only for egoists. Instead, we can argue that any rational agents who accept standard versions of hedonism about well-being, together with a welfarist theory of value, will find themselves experiencing the paradox of hedonism, prevented from obtaining what hedonists claim to be desirable.

And it is plausible that this suggests that pleasure is not the right kind of object to identify as what is ultimately desirable. In addition, I noted that even if this argument is not successful, there is still an important lesson to draw: that the main views at issue in the argument, each of which have been attractive to a number of philosophers, in fact form an inconsistent set.

I have also argued that the paradox of hedonism, if it is a problem at all, is in fact a symptom of a deeper problem, the paradox of desire satisfaction, which challenges all theories which claim that satisfying our desires is an essential part of well-being. Lastly, however, I argued that these theories can escape the problem by making the backgrounding move.

That is, these theories could claim that pleasure, desire satisfaction, or a hybrid of objective and subjective conditions are not themselves intrinsically good for us, but rather that they operate in the background, making other states intrinsically good for us. The paradox of hedonism objection, and the broader paradox of desire satisfaction objection, then, raise significant issues for theories of well-being.

As with the standard objections to hedonism, desire satisfactionism, and the hybrid theory, they force us to confront potentially uncomfortable aspects of the theories: in this case, facts about what it would be like to believe these theories. And they challenge us to develop stronger versions of these theories. His research interests include collective reasons for action, well-being, value, moral psychology, and effective altruism.

Bradley , Ben. Well-Being and Death. Oxford University Press. Bramble , Ben. Broad , C. Five Types of Ethical Theory. Butler , Joseph. Raphael , Hackett : — Cohen , G. Dietz , Alexander. These are the core obsessions that drive our newsroom—defining topics of seismic importance to the global economy. Our emails are made to shine in your inbox, with something fresh every morning, afternoon, and weekend. Hedonism gets a bad rap in our pleasure-espousing society.

And yet, despite all its connotations with frivolity and danger, the word simply describes the philosophical belief that pleasure is a worthwhile pursuit. The ancient Greek conception of hedonism embodies a far more simplistic, enjoyable approach to life than the consumerism and gluttony associated with contemporary uses of the word.

Epicurus believed both current and future pleasure are important. And these are good things, right? Sexual pleasure is linked with health and well-being.

For example, women who say they are satisfied with their sex life score higher on measures of psychological well-being and vitality. A regular glass of wine is said to have a protective effect against dementia and heart disease , perhaps due to its antioxidant flavonoids. And everyone knows the advantages of physical fitness. Many of the things that commonly give us pleasure can also be used in risky or harmful ways. Dependence, addiction , bingeing and compulsive consumption can be thought of as risky or harmful uses of otherwise pleasurable experiences, like using alcohol and other drugs , doing exercise and having sex.

It can be difficult to pin down the point at which a previously pleasurable behaviour becomes problematic. At this stage though, pleasure is no longer the motivation, nor the result, of the behaviour. Without pleasure, the behaviour is no longer a hedonic one. The single-minded pursuit of one intense pleasure at the expense of other aspects of life that bring meaning and pleasure is also counterproductive to living a rich and enjoyable life.

A practical definition might be someone who tries to maximise the everyday pleasures while still balancing other concerns. In fact, Epicurus emphasised a simple, harmonious life without the pursuit of riches or glory. Maximising pleasure, unlike with debauchery or addiction, need not take the form of more, bigger, better.

Instead, we savour everyday pleasures. Read more: Emotions and eating: a marketer's dream? So, if my morning coffee gives me pleasure, I might pause and relish it while I drink it: inhale the fragrance of it fully and focus on the nuanced warm, smoky, bitter deliciousness of it.

I should fully attend to the warmth of it in my hands, to the feeling of it in my mouth, and to the cascade of sensations and flavours it delivers.